We specify and solve a closed-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game, with a price-taking fringe. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game (à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes...

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a dierential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations...

We give a characterization, in feedback form, of the optimal extraction path of an exhaustible resource, which holds for a large class of models.

Myopia is important in environmental and resource management problems because they often involve inter temporal decisions over a long time horizon. We present a parsimonious extension of a standard dynamic programming equation in a continuous time and continuous state setting, which enables rich...