Following Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004) we use a model in which financial market access of households restrains the efficiency of the liquidity insurance that banks' deposit contracts provide to households that are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. But in contrast to these approaches...

Taking the Spanish market for deposits as a case study we show the importance of properly controlling for the quality of the services provided when assessing the degree of banking competition. While a simple approach based on estimating the price elasticity of the residual supply of deposit...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive bank-loans market and collateral constraints that tie investors credit capacity to the value of their real estate holdings. Banks set optimal lending rates taking into account the effects of their price policies on...

In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home...

Following the Hotelling model of spatial competition used by Massoud and Bernhardt (2002) to analyze competition in ATM fees, in this paper we analyze the effects of banning fees on the usage of ATMs by account holders. We find that the prohibition also reduces the fees charged to non-account...

The deregulation of financial services in the European Union and the development of information technology have fostered recent changes in the European banking industry. This process, that has affected market competition, has been accelerated by the establishment of the Economic and Monetary...

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract...

This paper empirically investigates the effect of government bail-out policies on banks outside the safety net. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the...

We estimate a dynamic banking model to quantify the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on the banking system. Our counterfactuals show that a one-dollar introduction of CBDC replaces bank deposits by around 80 cents on the margin. Bank lending falls by one-fourth of the drop in...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the...