Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 23,435
Cover Image
Research among Copycats: R&D, Spillovers, and Feedback Strategies
Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian - 2014
We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491339
Cover Image
Research among copycats : R&D, spillovers, and feedback strategies
Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian Oskar Ottokar - 2014
We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395083
Cover Image
Research among Copycats: R&D, Spillovers, and Feedback Strategies
Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265234
Cover Image
Bertrand competition with intertemporal demand
Dutta, Prajit K. (contributor);  … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource], This revision February 15, 2005
In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001652352
Cover Image
A Dynamic Duopoly Investment Game Without Commitment Under Uncertain Market Expansion
Boyer, Marcel - 2011
We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119144
Cover Image
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly With Entry and Exit
Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco - 2015
We present a continuous-time real options game in which two firms must decide at each instant of time whether to be in or out of a market that expands up to a random maturity date and contracts thereafter. Firms differ only in the opportunity costs of usage of the assets they employ (e.g., owing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073531
Cover Image
The Other Side of Limited Liability: Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing
Bayer, Christian - EconWPA - 2004
duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty. We find that limited liability and investment irreversibility is likely to produce … obligations in adverse states. However, market conditions themselves become endogenous in a duopoly since the quantity decisions … consequently monopolize the market. Therefore, the model of this paper explains predatory behavior in a duopoly without invoking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134505
Cover Image
Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments
Boyer, Marcel; Lasserre, Pierre; Mariotti, Thomas; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001
We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100881
Cover Image
The Dynamics of Industry Investments
Boyer, Marcel; Lasserre, Pierre; Moreaux, Michel - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2007
We study the development of a duopoly in a continuous-time model of capacity investment under no commitment by firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100992
Cover Image
On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game
Ruble, Richard; Versaevel, Bruno - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008
This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056865