We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good.We characterize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods.Further, we give characterizations for the...

This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and...

A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game.A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...

In this paper an algorithm is proposed to .nd a discrete zero point of a function on the collection of integral points in the n-dimensional Euclidean space IRn.Starting with a given integral point, the algorithm generates a .nite sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying dimension and...