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This paper extends the recent literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices.We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a uni.ed treatment to all cases considered in the literature so far.At a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092750
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092774
Let X be a non-empty, compact, convex set in Rn and ° an upper semi-continuous mapping from X to the collection of non-empty, compact, convex subsets of Rn.It is well known that such a mapping has a stationary point on X, i.e. there exists a point in X satisfying that its image under ° has a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092788
In all existing intersection theorems conditions are given under which acertain subset of acollection of sets has a non-empty intersection. In this paper conditions are formulated under which the intersection is a continuum of points satisfying some interesting topological properties. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090414
AMS classification: 90B18; 91A12; 91A43;
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090586
Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090663
We consider an exchange economy in which price rigidities are present. In the short run the non-numeraire commodities have a exible price level with respect to the numeraire commodity but their relative prices are mutually fixed. In the long run prices are assumed to be completely exible. For a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090816
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090907
In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game.A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091448
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091453