AMS classification: 90B18; 91A12; 91A43;

Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...

We consider an exchange economy in which price rigidities are present. In the short run the non-numeraire commodities have a exible price level with respect to the numeraire commodity but their relative prices are mutually fixed. In the long run prices are assumed to be completely exible. For a...

In this paper we generalize the concept of a non-transferable utility game by introducing the concept of a socially structured game.A socially structured game is given by a set of players, a possibly empty collection of internal organizations on any subset of players, for any internal...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...

This paper deals with the optimal provision of infrastructure by means of public-private partnership contracts.In the economic literature infrastructure is characterized as a large, indivisible and non-rival capital good that produces services for its users.Users can be both consumers and...

By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition that is a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players.It is well-known that balancedness is a...