Multiple-cost sharing rules often coexist in seemingly identical environments. We use shared irrigation costs as a context for examining the extent to which the structural environment explains the selection of a cost sharing rule. We find that environmental factors that?induce greater dependence...

The pre-nucleolus is a popular egalitarian solution concept for cost-sharing games. A drawback of this concept is that an associated cost allocation often cannot be calculated in polynomial time. Therefore, it would be convenient to know whether the pre-nucleolus of a particular game coincides...

We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all...

Cooperative TU-games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (1982) and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (1990). Linking these two concepts, Moulin (1990) introduces the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player...

We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the...

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et...

The simplest and most common interpretation of a coalitional form game is that it pertains to a single interaction among the players. However, many if not most cooperative endeavors occur more than once or even repeatedly over time. In this paper we begin a systematic study of dynamic...

We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a...

The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially...