In this paper we study cooperative cost games arising from domination problems on graphs.We introduce three games to model the cost allocation problem and we derive a necessary and su cient condition for the balancedness of all three games.Furthermore we study concavity of these games.

The T -measure is introduces as a method to rank the nodes in a digraph competition.It coincides with the T -value of an associated transferable utility game, the so-called digraph game.The T -measure is characterized in two ways.One of them is based on a characterization of the T -value in...

The paper studies the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient and Symmetry (LES) values in TU-games. It demonstrates that most of the results obtained by Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of semivalues and simple games are transposable on LES values and the whole TU-games set. In...

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics,...

AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...

AbstractThe following sections are included:PreliminariaTU Games in Partition Function FormSymmetrySuperadditivityEfficiencySuccessor FunctionNTU Games in Partition Function FormSuperior GamesExample: A Common-Property ResourceExample: A Cartel with Differentiated ProductsChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:Nontransferable Utility GamesZeuthen's SolutionNash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining PowerVariable-Threat BargainingNash Bargaining and Nash EquilibriumUnequal Bargaining PowerChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:A Brief Digression on the Noncooperative Stage of a Biform GameBargaining Power Biform GamesBiform Games and ExternalitiesSome Examples from the Recent LiteratureBrandenburger and Stuart (2007)Chatain and Zemsky (2007)Biform Games and Job MatchingA...

AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions