Similar Search Results

Renault, Régis - 2015

quality signaling or as a coordination device is described and discussed. The chapter then moves on to an analysis of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025249

Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favour of Price Regulations

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124138

Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlof, Johan N.M. - EconWPA - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412896

Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations

Frisell, Lars; Lagerloef, Johann - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652718

Strategic Inattention in Product Search

Hillenbrand, Adrian - 2019

Rapid technological developments in online markets fundamentally change the relationship between consumers and sellers. Online platforms can now easily gather data about the consumer and his search behavior, that allow for price discrimination. Therefore the consumers' product search becomes a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900926

Consumer Search and Optimal Information

Dogan, Mustafa - 2019

This paper studies an information design problem in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers, whose valuation of firm's products is uncertain, observe a noisy signal about the valuation upon being matched with a firm. The goal is to characterize those signal structures that maximize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895959

Adverse Selection Without Single Crossing

Schottmüller, Christoph - 2012

The single crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility. If single crossing is violated, global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. This paper studies monotone...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113458

Does Costly Persuasion Signal Quality?

Carroni, Elias - 2020

This article investigates how a privately-informed seller could signal her type by gathering information about the buyer's match value. We study two alternative ways to obtain information. In the first one, labeled information acquisition, the seller can acquire exogenous signals by facing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823542

Screening with Under-Utilization : Tiers, Multi-Part Tariffs, and Welfare Implications

Corrao, Roberto; Flynn, Joel P.; Sastry, Karthik - 2021

We study a screening model in which agents can under-utilize goods. We characterize implementable and optimal contracts and show that, whenever the principal values usage instrumentally, the optimal menu involves multi-part tariffs with tiers of zero marginal prices. We apply our results to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235451

Rationing Capacity in Advance Selling to Signal Quality

Yu, Man - 2013

product quality.We characterize the seller's signaling strategy and find that rationing of capacity in the advance period is … an effective tool of signaling product quality. We find that the high-quality seller can distinguish herself by … allocating less capacity than the low-quality seller in the advance period. We show that this signaling mechanism exists whenever …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013077464

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