This paper defends the idea that Western modernity can be characterized by the rivalry of two institutions, the state and the market, competing for the charge of maintaining security against social violence while both are major sources of violence. It is so because the possibility of violence...

We define continuous-time dynamics for exchange economies with fiat money. Traders have locally rational expectations, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and continuously adjust their short-run dominant strategy in a monetary strategic market game involving a double-auction with limit-price...

We reformulate Grandmont's and its successors' notion of behavioral heterogeneity such as to get the exact insensitivity of the aggregate budget share function with respect to changes in prices and income, instead of a mere approximate insensitivity. We propose a non parametric set-up such that,...

We define a continuous-time trading process for Arrow-Debreu exchange economies such that (1) At each time, myopic traders play a (weakly) dominant strategy in Mertens' (2003) limit price strategic market game ; (2) existence of continuous trade curves holds under weak conditions and in...

Static competitive equilibria in economies with incomplete markets are generically constrained suboptimal. Allocations induced by strategic equilibria of imperfectly competitive markets are also generically inefficient. In both cases, there is scope for Pareto-improving amendments. Considering...

We present a continuous time non tatonnement process for frictionless and perfectly competitive markets with (possibly non convex) production, where the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) emerges as the asymptotic value of unemployment. Consumers and producers are myopic and repeatedly...

We define a new index for the collective empowerment of populations based on the capability of actors to have relationships and to enter into networks. This index, called “relational capability” (RC), is dynamic in the sense that the weights of its various components vary across time...