Building on the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf, (1984) and Myers (1984), the present study empirically analyses the association between the board of directors’ composition and firm financing policies. Particularly, the fraction of independent directors on the board, the fraction of...

In this article we have expanded the analysis of the new dataset we created in Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) which analysed and quantified corporate disclosure on directors formally identified as independent by the forty Italian Blue Chips. We find here a general low level of compliance with...

In this article, we provide an interpretation for the voluntary independence requirements contained in the Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code) checking them against a proxy for international best practice, the independence criteria provided in the EC Recommendation on non-executive...

The hallmark of good corporate governance is an independent board of directors to oversee management. However, it is not clear that independent directors receive the information they need to make fully informed decisions on all key matters. Partly, this is due to an information gap, whereby...

Companies are required to have a reliable system of corporate governance in place at the time of IPO in order to protect the interests of public company investors and stakeholders. Yet, relatively little is known about the process by which they implement one. This Closer Look, based on detailed...

Classified boards actually benefit firms that have low monitoring costs and greater needs for advisory services. Previous literature has emphasized the entrenchment effect of classified boards. However, we find that this adverse impact of classified boards can be offset or even superseded by the...

This paper examines the influence and causal relationship between board of directors independence, CEO duality, and firm value. By estimating multivariate regression models for panel data, unbalanced, for a sample of companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, there resulted a positive...

After the financial crisis, the necessity to support large inefficient banks had a crucial impact on a number of economies in Europe. This paper focuses on the effect that corporate governance mechanisms has on performance for commercial banks operating in developed and emerging European...

We use the deaths of directors and chief executive officers as a natural experiment to generate exogenous variation in the time and resources available to independent directors at interlocked firms. The loss of such key co-employees is an attention shock because it increases the board committee...

We develop and test the hypothesis that private information incorporated into stock prices affects the structure of corporate boards. Stock price informativeness may be a complement to board monitoring, because the information revealed by prices can be used by directors to monitor management....