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Can contracts signal social norms? : experimental evidence
Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765609
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Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884174
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Becoming "we" instead of "I", identity management and incentives in the workplace
Donze, Jocelyn; Gunnes, Trude - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 148 (2018), pp. 105-120
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985958
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How Competitive are Female Professionals? A Tale of Identity Conflict
Cadsby, C. Bram; Servatka, Maros; Song, Fei - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011
and chose between piece-rate and competitive-tournament compensation. Identity priming, moderated by gender, significantly … driven not by lack of ability, but rather by the increased salience of gender/family identity, influenced by marriage and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275558
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Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816561
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Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929070
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Empowerment and the dark side of delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
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Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334129
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Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263163
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Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? On non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267567