Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 14,650
Cover Image
Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
Liang, Pinghan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 15-30
This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal–intermediary–agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049733
Cover Image
Preventing Collusion through Discretion
Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
of a collusive agreement a party has to incur to walk away from such a side deal. Delegation is then a simple way for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873329
Cover Image
Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
Liang, Pinghan - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 15-30
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239067
Cover Image
Collusion and delegation under information control
Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189018
Cover Image
Collusion and delegation under information control
Asseyer, Andreas - 2020
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160563
Cover Image
Collusion and delegation under information control
Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488
Cover Image
Collusion and delegation under information control
Asseyer, Andreas - 2020
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310
Cover Image
The Incentive Relation in Implementation
Mitnick, Barry M.; Backoff, Robert - 2019
The paper introduces the concepts of incentive relation and implementation relation, discussing them in the context of agent-principal relationships. The incentives literature relevant to implementation is reviewed, as well as relevant literature on individual behavior in organizations and on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032784
Cover Image
Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance
Abbott, Kenneth W.; Genschel, Philipp; Snidal, Duncan; … - In: Regulation & Governance 15 (2021), pp. S83-S101
rewards of different intermediary loyalties – both for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014485897
Cover Image
Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
Chen, Ying; Gordon, Sidartha - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 58 (2015) 3, pp. 543-569
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374036