We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, how the negative effects of government corruption on economic growth are magnified or reduced by capital account liberalization. Our model shows that highly corrupt countries impose higher tax rates than do less corrupt countries, thereby,...

This research demonstrates that international financial integration changes the way in which financial development affects inequality within a country. Specifically, both the cross-country analysis and the dynamic panel data analysis using data collected from more than 100 countries provide...

We identify countries that establish collateral-based lending systems with a small-open-economy version of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore’s (1997) model. We find that 47 countries in 1980s and 48 countries in 1990s out of 98 countries establish collateral-based lending systems. We also...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium growth model with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents to describe a self-fulfilling financial crisis accompanied by an asset bubble burst as a rational expectations equilibrium. Because of financial market imperfections, asset bubbles appear under mild...

Using a multi-country general equilibrium model, we demonstrate that when agents face credit constraints in an international financial market, rational expectations, which are ex-post heterogeneous between countries, cause business fluctuations. If the international financial market becomes...

We study the dynamic properties of growth rates in an overlapping generations economy with credit market imperfections. The analysis demonstrates that in early stages of financial development where credit constraints are severe, growth rates evolve monotonically. At the intermediate level of...

Credit market imperfections typically characterize a low quality financial market, where the quality of information about borrowers is low and/or enforcement rules or institutions are not well developed. We consider an economy with credit market imperfections and analyse how changes in the...

Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent’s overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive...

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, how the negative effect of government corruption on economic growth is magnified or reduced by capital account liberalization. Our model shows that highly corrupt countries impose higher tax rates than do less corrupt countries, thereby...