We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

This paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that prisoners' dilemmas or coordination games are played repeatedly within neighborhoods where players do not optimize but instead copy successful strategies. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing...

This paper models the way in which farmers use information about pre-existing varieties of a particular cereal crop to estimate the yield of new varieties on their farms. Generally, the yields of new and existing varieties are very highly correlated. Farmers are shown to gain more "effective...

The rational expectations hypothesis is supported if rational expectations are stable with respect to reasonable learning procedures. We consider the Stochastic Gradient-Algorithm as a boundedly rational learning procedure in an univariate ARX-Model with forecast feedback. We prove that whenever...

We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that potentially reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an undefeated equilibrium; though to be undefeated does not suffice to be the...

On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction...

In this study we consider a linear model with forecast feedback in which boundedly rational agents are learning the parameter values of the rational expectations equilibrium by the OLS learning procedure. We show strong consistency of the OLS estimates under much weaker assumptions on the...

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the...

This experiment explores whether individuals know that other people are biased. We confirm that overestimation of abilities is a pervasive problem, but observe that most people are not aware of it, i.e. they think others are unbiased. We investigate several explanations for this result. As a...