We exploit election-driven turnover in State and local governments in Germany to study how banks adjust their securities portfolios in response to the loss of political connections. We find that local savings banks, which are owned by their host county and supervised by local politicians,...

We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province based on electoral competition and...

The financial foundation of Germany's manufacturing success, according to the comparative capitalism literature, is an ample supply of long-term capital, provided to firms by a three-pillar banking system and “patient” domestic shareholders. This premise also informs the recent literature on...

Mortgage markets and their regulation have been a focus of increasingly polarized political debates, reflected in an academic literature showing the impact of partisan politics on financial markets. Since the financial crisis, states have played an increasing role in regulating mortgage...

Contemporary monetary systems permit those in positions of authority to exercise discretionary power in the pursuit of monetary policy objectives. We argue there are strong prima facie reasons why this is normatively problematic. Engaging the literature on the rule of law, we argue that a...

The theory of political benefits argues that politicians use state-owned banks for political purposes such as obtaining and maintaining political support. While the theory of social welfare goal argues that state-owned banks exist to counter market failures and finance socially important...

We extend the literature on ‘monetary constitutions' by arguing that binding rules must go beyond specifying the behavior of the monetary authority. Instead, a genuine monetary constitution must also be a financial constitution: it must take into account the natural and evolved links between...

We contribute to the post-crisis literature on macroeconomic stability by arguing that polycentric banking systems can better achieve stability than monocentric systems. Building on the theories of E. Ostrom, we engage the literature on free banking systems to show that these systems met the...

Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before...