This paper accounts for work sharing and unemployment in an efficiency wage model.The Solow condition holds when working hours are exogenous. Under the assumption of endogeneity and using general forms for the effort and cost functions, we prove that work sharing may have a reducing impact on...

We propose a dynamic efficiency wage model with learning by doing. By taking into account the change inthe stock of workers’ knowledge, firms set efficiency wages such that the effort–wage elasticity is not in general equal to one.

We consider a dual labor market with a continuum of heterogeneous workers differentiated by their ability of acquiring a specific training. In the primary sector, jobs require specific training and firms set efficiency wages. In the secondary sector, wages are competitive and no training is...

We consider a dual labor market with a continuum of heterogeneous workers differentiated by their ability of acquiring a specific skill. In the primary sector, jobs require firm-specific training and firms set efficiency wages. In the secondary sector, wages are competitive and no training is...

Leveraging a major Italian reform enacted in June 2012 that eroded employment protection to workers on permanent contracts, we use detailed administrative data to estimate how this reduction affected the cost of job loss. We employ a stacked-by-event research design, which compares workers...

Leveraging a major Italian reform enacted in June 2012 that eroded employment protection to workers on permanent contracts, we use detailed administrative data to estimate how this reduction affected the cost of job loss. We employ a stacked-by-event research design, which compares workers...

This paper proposes a model of efficiency wage with endogenous workers flows in interaction with imperfect competition on the product markets. Subject to economy-wide shocks, firms hire and fire workers thus generating a certain turnover. We show that the intensity of this turnover negatively...

updated version of paper no 55

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory...