by providing a set of positive results. First, we show that symmetric auctions are identifiable using three consecutive … bidders, as additional unobserved heterogeneity. Third, we extend our results to asymmetric auctions. Lastly, we apply our … methods to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions and find that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity reduces both bidder and …

Governmental agencies use score procurement auctions to incorporate other attributes beyond price in their purchase …-bid- first-price auctions to multi-attribute score auctions by incorporating the optimal bidding structure …

auctions in China. Our estimates suggest substantial gains from accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in reserve prices. We …

asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data … identification in auctions with a stochastic number of bidders. Furthermore, I show that my results can be extended to generalized …

For symmetric auctions, there is a close relationship between distributions of order statistics of bidders’ valuations … of descending bid auctions and strategic equivalents. …

Buy price auctions merge a posted price option with a standard bidding mechanisms, and have been used by various online …’s expected revenue over standard auctions. We show that data from buy price auctions can be used to identify bidders’ risk …

This paper proposes a nonparametric test of exogenous participation in first-price auctions. Exogenous participation … in finite samples. We implement our method on data from the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. We also discuss how our … test can be adapted to other testing problems in auctions. …

This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1970. These are … values to test the comparative static prediction in common value auctions that bidders tend to bid less aggressively when …