A fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the...

We propose a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the impact of incentives on cost reduction. We show theoretically, and estimate empirically, that German electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) pile up more costs in the year used to determine future prices when subject...

We propose a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the impact of incentives on cost reduction. We show theoretically, and estimate empirically, that German electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) incur higher costs when subject to a lower-powered regulation mechanism. The...

A fully unbundled, regulated network fi?rm of unknown efficiency level can undertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g., by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to...

Yardstick regulation requires the utilization of benchmarking, a valuable tool for improving the public service delivery, especially in developing countries where inefficiencies translate into negative health impacts and social unrest. However, research must account for both cost and quality of...

This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation where firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. The optimal assignment of property rights must...

A fully unbundled, regulated network firm of unknown efficiency level can untertake unobservable effort to increase the likelihood of low downstream prices, e.g. by facilitating downstream competition. To incentivize such effort, the regulator can use an incentive scheme paying transfers to the...

This paper considers the evolution of the British model of independent utility regulation from the publication of the 1983 Littlechild Report on telecom regulation. Over the last ten years, the model has faced some threats to its pro-competition emphasis, notably in energy regulation and...

This paper provides a perspective from two economic regulators on the way in which economic regulation in the UK has developed over time. Regulation has delivered great benefits, but its development has been at odds with expectations at the time of privatisation. In particular, effective...