This study presents an overlapping-generations model featuring endogenous growth, collective wage-bargaining, and probabilistic voting over fiscal policy. We charac- terize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game within and across generations and show the following results....

This study presents an overlapping generations model to capture the nature of the competition between generations regarding two redistribution policies, public education and public pensions. In addition, we investigate the effects of population aging on these policies and economic growth from a...

This study extends the multi-country, politico-economic model of fiscal policy developed by Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) to incorporate wage inequality within each country. In this extended framework, we present conflict within and across generations over fiscal policy and show that...

This paper develops an overlapping-generations model including wage inequality within a generation and intra- and intergenerational resource reallocation via social security. Based on the concept of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, the paper focuses on the feedback mechanism between...

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts their educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following...

This paper introduces an overlapping-generations model with earnings hetero- geneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue across social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game...

This paper introduces an overlapping generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labor income tax and the allocation of tax revenue across social security and public goods provision are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive...

This study presents a two-period overlapping-generations model featuring en- dogenous growth and intergenerational conflict over fiscal policy. In particular, we characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game between gen- erations, and show the following results. First,...