We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted...

We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how – during crisis – deposit insurance affects depositor behavior. Our focus is on Belgium where the government increased explicit deposit insurance coverage and implemented implicit deposit insurance arrangements. Estimating sorting...

We provide a model that unifies the notion of self-fulfilling banking crises and sovereign debt crises. In this model, a bank run can be contagious by triggering a sovereign default, and vice versa. A deposit insurance scheme can eliminate the adverse equilibrium only if the government can repay...

Recent econometric evidence has noticeably changed views on the desirability and the appropriate design of explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at the data. After surveying recent empirical work and providing a theoretical framework, we...

In August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over 140 years. Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. In fact, ten years...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

This paper develops a global game model that allows for a rigorous analysis of partial deposit insurance and provides the first comparative statics of the optimal level of deposit coverage. The optimal amount of coverage increases with lower bank liquidity requirements, with a higher precision...

I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured...

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system.We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to...

The paper presents a study of Russian banks' interest rates on household deposits during the formation period of the deposit insurance system. It is shown that market discipline weakened after deposit insurance was effectively in place.