Showing 1 - 10 of 948
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We offer two characterizations of the prominent lottery assignment mechanism called the probabilistic serial. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008457222
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008507993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457128
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404103
End-stage renal disease (ESRD) is the ninth-leading cause of death in the U.S. Transplantation is the most viable renal replacement therapy for ESRD patients, but there is a severe disparity between the demand for kidneys for transplantation and the supply. This shortage is further complicated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318155
Although a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319240
The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456293
Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. Incentive compatibility and efficiency are primary concerns in designing such mechanisms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517650
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517651
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517652