We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of...

The paper, the first one to empirically examine whether individual accounts internalize the cost of unemployment, estimates the determinants of job finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program. This is a unique, innovative program that combines social insurance,...

This paper discusses the sensitivity of the labor market outcome in the standard bargaining paradigms - monopoly union and efficient bargaining - to the existence of a budget constraint pending on the financing of the unemployment benefit. Consequences of how the unions value members and...

In an experimental setting some Danish unemployed workers were assigned to an activation program while others were not. Unemployed who were assigned to the activation program found a job more quickly. We show that the activation effect increases with the distance between the place of residence...

Canada’s current system of fiscal federalism, which results in very large transfers of resources from have provinces to have-not provinces, promotes consumption over investment and hence does not maximize our productivity potential. The author recommends reform of Employment Insurance towards...

This paper analyses a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady-state properties of the private unemployment...

This paper investigates how a mandatory activation program in Denmark affects the job finding rate of unemployed workers.The activation program was introduced in an experimental setting where about half of the workers who became unemployed in the period from November 2005 to March 2006 were...

We study how changes in the maximum benefit duration affec the inow into unemployment in the Netherlands. Until August 2003, workers who became un- employed after age 57.5 were entitled to unemployment benefits until the age of 65, after which they would receive old age pensions. This...

This paper investigates how the potential duration of unemployment benefits affects the quality of post-unemployment jobs.It takes advantage of a natural experiment introduced by a change in Slovenia's unemployment insurance law that substantially reduced the potential benefit duration.Although...

This paper investigates the disincentive effects of the potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits.The disincentive effects are identified by exploiting changes in the UI system in Slovenia, which involved substantial reductions in the potential benefit duration and had...