We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that the effectiveness of lobbying lies in...

We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects <p> interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision <p> of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that <p> the effectiveness of lobbying lies in...</p></p></p>

We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s parameters)...

Over the last few decades, Taiwanese society has witnessed processes of localization/ Taiwanization/ de- and re-Sinicization (Sinification), all vying for legitimacy. These trends in the nation-building process are played out on the state as well as the civil society level. It can thus be useful...

A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the...