This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three different objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality...

In this paper we consider a model of lobbying in which an interest group can lobby either the bureaucracy or the Congress for their preferred policy. The implications of the choice by a lobbyist of whom to lobby (the agency or the legislature) are explored. The main findings of the paper are...

In this paper, we model lobbying and the initiative process as a one-shot game between groups of citizens and the legislature. We model voters as random utility maximizers, as in McKelvey and Patty (2000). Our solution concept is Bayes equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. Modeling the...

This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three different objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality...

In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equilibria as a function of voter behavior, we find that what we term...

This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three different objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality...

In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n 2 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finite...