There is some evidence that people have biased perceptions of risks, such as lethal or environmental risks. Hence their behavior is based on beliefs which may di¤er from the ’objective’ beliefs used by a regulator. The optimal regulation then depends on this di¤erence in...

The paper investigates a climate-economy model with an iso-elastic welfare function in which one parameter gamma measures relative risk-aversion and a distinct parameter rho measures resistance to intertemporal substitution. We show both theoretically and numerically that climate policy responds...

Les auteurs cherchent à justifier le principe de précaution (Traité de Maastricht) qui veut que l'absence de certitudes, compte tenu des connaissances scientifiques du moment, ne retarde pas l'adoption de mesures de prévention des risques. Pour ce faire, ils considèrent le problème d'un...

We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for entry to be unprofitable in markets with adverse selection is that that no buyer type be willing to trade at a price above the expected unit cost of serving those types who are weakly more eager to trade than her. We provide two applications...

We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades, as each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase...

Many financial markets rely on a discriminatory limit-order book to balance supply and demand. We study these markets in a static model in which uninformed market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to trade with an informed insider, as in Glosten (1994), Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000), and...