We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse - with synchronized elections, i.e....

Dans cet article, nous dérivons de façon endogène le phénomène de contrainte budgétaire molle dans le cadre d’une fédération lorsque les décisions budgétaires sont prises au niveau décentralisé. Dans ce modèle, la mollesse de la contrainte budgétaire régionale découle de...

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse—with synchronized elections, i.e....

We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if...

This paper examines a situation where a decision-maker determines the appropriate compensation that should be implemented for a given ecological damage. The compensation can be either or both in monetary and environmental units to meet three goals : i) no aggregate welfare loss, ii) minimization...

This paper examines a situation where a decision-maker determines the appropriate compensation that should be implemented for a given ecological damage. The compensation can be either or both in monetary and environmental units to meet three goals: i) minimization of the cost associated with the...

This paper analyses the impact of funding source of the bailout on the softness of the regional budget constraint. We show that the funding source of the bailout has a considerable impact both on the credibility of the federal government's commitment and on the regional opportunistic behaviour....

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse - with synchronized elections, i.e....

In this methodological paper, we prove that the key tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988), extended to asymmetric regions, possesses a Nash equilibrium under several assumptions commonly adopted in the literature : goods are supposed to be normal ;...