This paper concerns income and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdictional <p> framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction <p> is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world <p> market prices via public policy. In such a framework, a...</p></p></p>

This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, production taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world-market...

This paper characterizes income and commodity taxation as the outcome of a noncooperative Nash game in a two-country economy where one of the countries produces an environmentally clean good, while the other produces a dirty good. Among the results, it is shown that the commodity tax on the...

We study how the opportunity to trade in trash might influence the equilibrium outcome when the tax on the externality is determined by a political economy process. In our model, individuals have heterogeneous preferences for environmental quality, and there is a leakage when funds are...

We study how the opportunity to trade in trash might influence the equilibrium outcome when the tax on the externality is determined by a political economy process. In our model, individuals have heterogeneous preferences for environmental quality, and there is a leakage when funds are...