explain this finding with reference to CEO prior uncertainty: due to information asymmetry and/or uncertainty about the …. Consistent with this explanation, CEOs with higher prior uncertainty exhibit higher first-year delta: First-year delta is higher …

different macroeconomic conditions to identify their influence on managers' risk incentives. More than 11,000 industrial firms … loan interest rates, the ZLB and monetary market stability, increase the managers' risk incentives, proxied by the … of firms' managers in the US in recent years and how the monitoring of institutional ownership influences these relations …

interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay translates in a reduction of the failure risk probability by approximately 21 … failure risk. The effectiveness of CEO pay is strengthened among well-governed firms, whereas tournament incentives are … essential when there is high CEO succession risk. Both measures of executive pay are associated with better financial reporting …

masculine-faced CEOs' compensation is more sensitive to the risk of the firm. The result is robust when we use AI (artificial …

Transaction costs in trading involve both risk and return. The return is associated with the cost of immediate … execution and the risk is a result of price movements during a more gradual trading. The paper shows that the trade-off between … risk and return in optimal execution should reflect the same risk preferences as in ordinary investment. The paper develops …

We examine the causal effect of managerial litigation risk on managers' disclosure of earnings warnings in the face of … litigation risk, we find that the adoption leads to a decrease in managers' issuance of earnings warnings, especially among firms … facing a higher litigation risk prior to the adoption. In contrast, we find no change in managers' tendency to alert …

lower pay, these CEOs have longer tenure and their boards' replacement decisions are less sensitive to their performance …, which is consistent with the view that there is a trade-off between pay and dismissal risk. To mitigate endogeneity concerns …, I use divorce as an exogenous negative shock to CEO equity ownership, and find that following a divorce, turnover risk …

We study the impact of endogenous shocks driven by collective actions of managers. We analyze how such endogenous … allocation is suboptimal because of the externalities in managers' wages and in equity market. We establish that a socially … optimal allocation can be achieved if the planner imposes wage taxes (or subsidies) on managers and equity taxes. Our results …