We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability...

We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. Stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the players' risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences...

In a mutual control structure agents exercise control over each other. Typical examples occur in the area of corporate governance firms and investment companies exercise mutual control, in particular by owning each others stocks. In this paper we formulate a general model for such situations....

This paper introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic inconsistency in the context of Markov decision problems. It carefully decouples and examines concepts that are often entwined in the literature it distinguishes between the decision maker and its various temporal agents, and...

What is a good incentive-compatible policy when one wants to respect individual choices of labor and human capital but eliminate inequalities due to unequal access to human capital and different returns to human capital, and when earnings and human capital expenditures are the only verifiable...

To accurately predict behavior economists need reliable measures of individual time preferences and attitudes toward risk and typically need to assume stability of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount...

In this paper we consider several modified wild bootstrap methods that, additionally to heteroskedasticity, can take dependence into account. The modified wild bootstrap methods are shown to correctly replicate an invariance principle for multivariate time series that are characterized by...

Adverse selection inherent in the bank-borrower relationship typically intensifies during crises. This problem is expecially severe in emerging markets, characterized by weak institutions and banks with poorly developed monitoring and screening abilities. Exploiting a unique sample of Vietnamese...

This paper considers estimation of factor-augmented panel data regression models with homogenous slope coefficients. One of the most popular approaches towards this end is the pooled common correlated effects CCE estimator of Pesaran 2006. For this estimator to be consistent at the usual sqrt-NT...

In this paper we explore the effects of alternative combinations of fiscal and monetary policies under different income distribution regimes. In particular, we aim at evaluating fiscal rules in economies subject to banking crises and deep recessions. We do so using an agent-based model populated...