How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities,...

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player...

Economic models describe individuals in terms of underlying characteristics, such as taste for some good, sympathy level for another player, time discount rate, risk attitude, and so on. In real life, such characteristics change through experiences: taste for Mozart changes through listening to...

We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon 0, in a classof multi-player games with perfect information, which we call free transition games. The noveltyis that a non-trivial class of perfect information games is solved for subgame-perfection, withmultiple...

Incomplete preferences over lotteries on a ¯nite set of alternatives satisfying, besides independence and continuity, a property called bad outcome aversion are considered. These preferences are characterized in terms of their speci¯c multi-expected utility representations (cf. Dubra et al.,...

In this survey we analyze, and compare, various sufficient epistemic conditions for backward induction that have been proposed in the literature. To this purpose we present a simple epistemic base model for games with perfect information, and translate the different models into the language of...

We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for...

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only independent (i.e., propositionwise) aggregation rules generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A...

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an...

A set of agents with different waiting costs have to receive a service of different length of time from a single provider which can serve only one agent at a time. One needs to form a queue and set up monetary transfers to compensate the agents who have to wait. We prove that no rule satisfies...