The paper examines bargaining over a one--dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptance rule. We consider a class of delta-equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies that are free of coordination failures in the response stage.We show that along any...

We consider n--person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non--empty compact convex subset of a Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in player i''s strategy. No further...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i''s own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff...

The paper studies the model of multilateral bargaining over the alternatives representedby points in the m–dimensional Euclidean space. Proposers are chosen randomly and the acceptance of a proposal requires the unanimous approval of it by all the players. The focus of the paper is on the...

Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner''s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a...

We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the unit interval. The acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by an acceptance rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic...

There is a growing body of research in economics that studies the consequences of time-inconsistent preferences. This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium setting. We discuss how the standard notion of competitive equilibrium should be extended in order to...

The paper addresses the following question: how efficient is the market system in allocating resources if trade takes place at some prices $p$ that are not necessarily competitive? Even though there are many partial answers to this question, an answer that stands comparison to the rigor by which...

By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition that is a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. It is well-known that balancedness is a...

When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal, which provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a Pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account. An appealing aspect of price...