We consider a game G(n) played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z(1),...,Z(n), each of which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations z :=...

En este artículo, los autores pretenden mostrar y explicar cómo la Teoría de Lie se puede aplicar a la resolución de algunos problemas relativos a la Economía y a las Finanzas. Concretamente, se realiza un análisis de dos de esos problemas y se discuten tanto sus aspectos matemáticos como...

An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the directrevelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paperprovides characterizations...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i''s own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff...

We consider networks evolving over time within an infinite-horizon dynamic setting. Transitions from one network to another are given by a stationary transition probability matrix. We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating the value of a network at any point in time among its...

Gibbard''s (1973) and Satterthwaite''s (1975) result implies that anonymous surjective social choice functions on more than two alternatives are manipulable. Placing some mild constraints on the number of agents compared to the number of alternatives, we show what the minimal number of...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

This paper assesses the significance of financing constraints in investment decisions for a balanced panel of 206 of the largest Dutch manufacturing firms over the period 1983-1996, employing split sample analysis of reduced form investment equations. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that...