Showing 141 - 150 of 502
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005304938
This paper assesses the significance of financing constraints in investment decisions for a balanced panel of 206 of the largest Dutch manufacturing firms over the period 1983-1996, employing split sample analysis of reduced form investment equations. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005304969
In this paper we show how to compute a daily VaR measure for two stock indexes (CAC40 and SP500) using the one-day-ahead forecast of the daily realized volatility. The daily re-alized volatility is equal to the sum of the squared intraday returns over a given day and thus uses intraday...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005305000
In this paper we develop an epistemic model for dynamic games in which players may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences (including the opponents'' utility functions) as the game proceeds. Within this framework, we propose a rationalizability concept that is based upon the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005305010
A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005305012
In this paper, we consider a two-stage (sequential) game as introduced by Vickers (1985),Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). This game models the situation where the owners of competing firms manipulate their managers'' incentive contracts for strategic reasons....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005305023
We consider a game G(n) played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z(1),...,Z(n), each of which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations z :=...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256464
Sraffa's book artfully combines an exposition of key problems of capital theory, using economic logic, with mathematical arguments, and he created a school of disciples extending his ideas by means of both methods. His analysis of single product systems has turned out essentially to be flawless,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005282358
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178890
The claim in this paper is that Sraffa employed a rigorous logic of mathematical reasoning in his book, Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (PCC), in such a way that the existence proofs were constructive. This is the kind of mathematics that was prevalent at the beginning of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187033