We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant … strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant … strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify … settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify … settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify … settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant … strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable … a knapsack game. We derive the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We find that simultaneous take …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable … a knapsack game. We derive the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We ?nd that simultaneous take …