A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and … sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer … extension of Dantzig's greedy heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. We use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and … sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer … extension of Dantzig's greedy heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. We use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the …

discuss the problem in a detail free setting. -- Mechanism Design ; Subsidies ; Budget ; Procurement ; Knapsack Problem …A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable … a knapsack game. We derive the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We find that simultaneous takeit …

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …

procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability … rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this …

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional … costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the …

procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability … rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts …

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and … Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation under the constraint that sellers are protected by …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award … procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under …