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International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain

Dequiedt, Vianney; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants than for natives. There are two stages. In the first one, workers in the South decide whether to move and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144730

International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain

Dequiedt, Vianney; Zenou, Yves - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147301

Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay

Tirole, Jean; Weyl, Glen - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147365

Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information

Özer, Özalp; Wei, Wei - In: Management Science 52 (2006) 8, pp. 1238-1257

We study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer. The supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009208661

Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning

Chen, Fangruo - In: Management Science 51 (2005) 1, pp. 60-75

Salespeople are the eyes and ears of the firms they serve. They possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of decisions. A key question is how a firm can provide incentives to its salesforce so that it is in their interest to truthfully disclose their information about the market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009208803

Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods

Sundararajan, Arun - In: Management Science 50 (2004) 12, pp. 1660-1673

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible and administering usage-based pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering fixed-fee pricing in addition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009214159

Design of Product Specifications for Multi-Characteristic Inspection

Tang, Kwei; Tang, Jen - In: Management Science 35 (1989) 6, pp. 743-756

-characteristic screening (complete inspection) models are proposed with different information processing requirements. In both models …, screening specifications are jointly determined by considering all the economic and stochastic factors associated with the … characteristics of interest. However, in Model 1, each characteristic has separate screening specifications and the inspection results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009214502

Asymmetric Information and Economies of Scale in Service Contracting

Akan, Mustafa; Bar{\i}\c{s} Ata; Lariviere, Martin A. - In: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 13 (2011) 1, pp. 58-72

We consider outsourcing in two important service settings: call center and order fulfillment operations. An important factor in both is the inherent economies of scale. Therefore, we advance a unifying model covering both applications and study the associated contracting problem under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009218613

Employee Screening : Theory and Evidence

Huang, Fali; Cappelli, Peter - East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) - 2006

systems. We analyze the relationship between screening and monitoring in the context of a principal-agent model and test the … monitoring is more difficult. This screening is also associated with higher productivity and higher wages and benefits, as … pay higher wages to attract and retain such workers. Screening for other attributes, such as cognitive ability, does not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009363337

To Trust or to Monitor : A Dynamic Analysis

Huang, Fali - East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) - 2007

In a principalagent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009363355