The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter’s and the subjects’ models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We primarily focus on experiments designed to test a hypothesis by comparing behavior...

Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take money from a partner. Dictator game giving therefore does not stem from orthodox social preferences. It can be...

We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations behind costly punishment and rewarding. Our findings qualify existing evidence and suggest that the largest fraction of players is motivated by a mixture of both inequity-aversion and reciprocity, while...

problémáiknak, amelyeknek több évtizedre visszanyúló hagyományai vannak a modern közgazdaságtanban is. A magyar nyelvű szakirodalomban azonban sajátos módon kevés ilyen témájú elméleti munkát olvashatunk. A tanulmány röviden áttekinti a kiinduló dilemmához kapcsolódó...

In this paper we give a survey of recent works on game theory devoted to modeling of decision making process under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism),...

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to isolate the impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthiness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences - like altruism, inequality aversion, quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness - reacting to...

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to isolate the impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthiness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences -- like altruism, inequality aversion, quasi-maximin, etc.; (ii) deal-responsiveness -- reacting to...

This paper justifies the evolution of the college admissions system in China from a mechanism design perspective. The sequential choice algorithm and the parallel choice algorithm used in the context of China's college admissions system are formulated as the well-studied Boston mechanism and the...

This paper extends the work of Zhu Xianchen and Li Yulian (2007) by introducing the fairness compatibility constraint. Our work strengthens the explanatory power of their model. Whether a collective action can be realized depends not only on the organizer and followers' individual rationality...

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...