The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where...

This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: reputation causing...

Principals can attempt to get agents to perform certain actions preferable to the principal by using ex-post punishments or rewards to align incentives. Field data is mixed on whether, and to what extent, such informal incentive contracting crowds out efficient solutions to the agency problem....

Progressivity, inequality reduction and merging-proofness are three well-known axioms in taxation. We investigate implications of each of the three axioms through characterizations of several families of taxation rules and their logical relations. We also study the preservation of these axioms...

A new concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions is discussed, analyzed, and related to the homonymous property within the rationing context. The class of additive and consistent mechanisms is isomorphic to the class of consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Consequently average and...

Previous research on gender differences in behavior has led to seemingly contradictory findings about generosity. From data generated by 290 subject pairs, we find that women are more sensitive than men to the costs of generous actions when deciding whether or not to be generous. The factors...

We conduct dictator games in our artefactual field experiment with 11th and 12th grade students in New Delhi, India. We construct an economic status index based on household ownership of assets for our subjects. Using cut-offs from this index, we randomly match dictators to recipients who are...

We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of research showing that people react to the language in which...

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept---robust equilibrium---that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred...

We study the development of bargaining behavior in children age seven through 18, using ultimatum and dictator games. We find that bargaining behavior changes substantially with age and that most of this change appears to be related to changes in preferences for fairness, rather than bargaining...