In this paper we introduce the concept of rational probability measures. These are probabilitymeasures that map every Borel event to a rational number. We show that a rational probabilitymeasure has a finite support. As a consequence we prove a new version of Kolmogorov extensiontheorem. In the...

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at...

The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the `wisdom of crowds''. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises---voter independence---is notoriously violated. This premise carries...

This paper is the first attempt at quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Soviet literature on general equilibrium theory in 1960—1990s. We divide the papers into four subgroups: von Neumann—Gale class of models and equilibrium growth; Arrow—Debreu class of models; disequilibrium...

A general collective decision problem is analysed. It consists in many issues that are interconnected in two ways: by mutual constraints and by connections of relevance. The goal is to decide on the issues by respecting the mutual constraints and by aggregating in accordance with an...

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally...

This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable. The lower bound is derived when there are three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. We...

This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is derived when the social choice function is nondictatorial and unanimous. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is...

In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow''s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a...

In this paper, we consider a two-stage (sequential) game as introduced by Vickers (1985),Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). This game models the situation where the owners of competing firms manipulate their managers'' incentive contracts for strategic reasons....