We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines marketdiscipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crisesimposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safeportfolio strategy to prevent early...

We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset...

Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of banks' sovereign exposures and their effects on lending during and after the crisis. Public, bailed-out and poorly capitalized banks responded to sovereign stress by purchasing domestic public...

Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the causes and effects of banks’ sovereign exposures during and after the euro crisis. First, in the vulnerable countries, the publicly owned, recently bailed out and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to...

Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of changes in banks’ sovereign exposures and their effects during and after the euro crisis. First, the publicly owned, recently bailed out and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to...

Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the causes and effects of banks' sovereign exposures during and after the euro crisis. First, in the vulnerable countries, the publicly owned, recently bailed out and less strongly capitalized banks reacted to...

Little is known about how banks’ domestic funding networks affect the transmission of capital flows reversals to the real economy. Our robust results show that a foreign funding shock to banks in Brazil negatively affects lending by their regional branches, especially when they are subjected...

In Europe, the financial stability mandate generally rests at the national level. But there is an important exception. Since the establishment of the Banking Union in 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) can impose stricter regulations than the national regulator. The precondition is that the...

Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening - especially for mortgages - is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for...

Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening – especially for mortgages – is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision...