This paper develops a fully-solvable equilibrium matching model of incomplete information with early skill acquisition to provide general theoretical insights into fast rising top income inequality observed in the United States. Fast rising top income inequality is endogenously accommodated: In...

This paper provides a unified approach to equilibrium analysis in models for competing mechanisms (e.g., Szentes (2009), Yamashita (2010)), which may differ in terms of delegation of action choice, announcement of mechanisms, observability of messages, and equilibrium notions

This paper studies excise tax policy that applies different tax rates to differentiated products. We propose a general method, from the revealed preferences perspective, that allows the identification of the policy maker’s unobserved preferences when setting excise tax rates. We use it to...

We develop a model of the labor market where firms incur an adjustment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out more frequently than equally skilled...

This paper studies competition among multiple sellers in frictional markets. Ex-post equilibrium is tractable in terms of market information revelation. Applying the sufficient condition for equilibrium robustness (with respect to a seller's deviation to any arbitrary selling mechanism) to...