An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure programs to create incentives for pollution control. Previous empirical analyses of monitoring and enforcement issues have focused strictly on the impact of such traditional practices as monitoring (inspections) and enforcement...

It is said that firms in developing countries do not have incentives to invest in pollution control because of the weak monitoring and enforcement of the environmental regulations. This argument assumes that the regulator is the only agent that can create incentives for pollution control, and...

Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance in the Chinese city of Zhenjiang, and citizens' complaints have a significant impact on inspections. So stronger information and education campaigns may improve social welfare in the city. Little empirical...

Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of...

This paper presents a case study of willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimation using random valuation models. A contingent valuation survey was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia to estimate people's WTP for the protection of Lake Sevan. Three elicitation formats-open-ended, closed-ended, and the stochastic...