Conflicts of interest over fiscal sustainability between an organization's planning and implementing branches creates the need for institutions that align incentives and curb the bargaining power of the implementing branch. We examine this general public sector problem by collecting unique data...

Whenever a central government faces a sub-unit in financial distress, the unpleasant question arises of whether to assist the unit or not. On the one hand, resisting to bail out the unit may lead to default or bankruptcy, which could be very costly both economically and politically. On the other...

Conflicts of interest within hierarchic government organizations regarding the importance of fiscal discipline create the need for institutions that curb the bargaining power of units in charge of implementing policy and align their incentives to the interests of the whole organization. We...

Central government bailouts of local governments are commonly viewed as a recipe for local fiscal indiscipline, as local governments learn that the center will come to the rescue in times of trouble. However, little is known about the consequences of bailouts granted conditional on local...

Antibiotics resistance is a major threat to public health. We examine if pay-for-performance (P4P) to primary care providers stimulates appropriate prescription of antibiotics; specifically, if P4P induces a substitution of narrow-spectrum antibiotics for broad-spectrum antibiotics (which...

Policies aimed to spur quality competition among health care providers are ubiquitous, but their impact on quality is ex ante ambiguous. This study contributes to the sparse empirical literature on primary care quality by examining the heterogeneous impact of recent competition enhancing reforms...

Consumer choice of services that are financed by a third party may improve the matching of consumers and providers, and spur competition over quality dimensions relevant to consumers. However, in markets characterized by information frictions and switching costs, the gains from choice may fail...

Market frictions, such as imperfect information or hassle costs, may reduce benefits from market incentives in healthcare settings. We use data from two randomised policy interventions in a Swedish region, which improved the access to provider information and reduced the switching costs of one...

Reducing socioeconomic health inequalities is a key goal of most health systems. When care providers are paid prospectively, e.g., by a fixed sum per patient, existing inequalities may be sustained by the incentives to undertreat relatively unhealthy patients. To counter this, prospective...