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We endogenize location/product specification choices in a spatial Cournot duopoly on the linear market when firms' output entails an accidental harm to the environment. Under a strict liability regime, the equilibrium involves no differentiation if the expected harm is low enough. This outcome...
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This paper analyzes liability rules when consumers and third parties/the environment incur harm. Expected harm is convex in the level of output and modeled as a power function. We show that the social ranking of liability rules previously established for the case in which only consumers suffer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013329736
In this paper we deal with the basic two-period consumption saving problem where the first and second period consumption utility, respectively v and u is assumed to be concave as usually. Considering the usual assumption of identity of u and v, we show that prudence is fully characterized by the...
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The objective of the paper is to analyze the risk management behavior of a non-industrial private forest owner under uncertainty about the timber production. Two types of hedging strategies with harvesting decisions are studied: a financial practice versus a physical one. We develop a two-period...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209855
In this paper, we deal with the basic two-period consumption saving problem where the first and second period consumption utility, respectively v is assumed to be concave as usually. Considering the usual assumption of identify of u and v, we show that prudence is fully characterized by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670946
The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789358