We hypothesize that poor country-level governance, which makes public information less reliable, induces fund managers to increase their use of semi-public information. Utilizing data from international mutual funds and stocks over the 2000-2009 period, we find that semi-public...

We study how the presence of short sellers affects the incentives of the insiders to trade on negative information. We show it induces insiders to sell more (shares from their existing stakes) and trade faster to preempt the potential competition from short sellers. An experiment and...

We investigate an informal yet important mechanism in the private equity industry that helps to reduce uncertainty: relationship building. Based on a large sample of private equity funds over the 1980-2010 period, we find that the general partners strategically allocate good funds to loyal...

Firms in global markets often belong to business groups. We argue that this feature can have a profound influence on international asset pricing. In bad times, business groups may strategically reallocate risk across affiliated firms to protect core “central firms.” This strategic behavior...

The rise of social media has encouraged guru dreams because of the low entry barrier and highly skewed distribution of public attention that characterize social media. The pursuit of guru status, however, may be achieved through information provision or cheap talk, and competition inherent to...

We investigate the impact of the absence of short selling on the pricing of managerial skills in the mutual fund industry. In the presence of divergent opinions regarding managerial skills, fund managers can strategically use fees to attract only the most optimistic capital. The recognition of...

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for 33 countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the...

We hypothesize that poor country-level governance, which makes public information less reliable, induces fund managers to increase their use of semi-public information. Utilizing data from international mutual funds and stocks over the 2000-2009 period, we find that semi-public...

We explore the relationship between internal governance and the disciplining mechanisms created by the threat of short selling (i.e. “short-selling potential”). We argue that the presence of short selling increases the cost of agency problems for shareholders and incentivizes them to improve...

We examine whether information manipulation by firms may reflect fundamental cooperation conventions induced by social norms in China. Consistent with this notion, we find that China’s leading social norms related to alcohol consumption and social drinking enhance earnings manipulation. An...