This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer payment that induces a bank manager to...

Summary In macroeconomic models, the nominal money supply, the long-term nominal interest rate, or even the inflation rate usually serves as the monetary policy variable. In practice, however, none of these variables is directly controlled by the central bank. Consequently, these models do not...

This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer payment that induces a bank manager to...

This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer payment that induces a bank manager to...

This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer payment that induces a bank manager to...

Im November 2014 wird die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) die Bankenaufsicht im Euroraum übernehmen. Die vorliegende Arbeit skizziert den bisherigen Weg zur einheitlichen Bankenaufsicht und beschreibt kurz die Kernpunkte der entsprechenden Verordnung. Es werden dann die Vor- und Nachteile einer...

[Einführung] Vor dem Hintergrund der sich zuspitzenden Bank- und Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum legte der Präsident des Europäischen Rates, Herman van Rompuy, im Juni 2012 einen Bericht vor, in dem Bausteine für eine neue Architektur der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (EWWU)...