Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005, Kojima and Pathak, 2009 and Lee,...

In variants of the Electronic Mail Game (Rubinstein, 1989) where two or more players communicate via multiple channels, the multiple channels can facilitate collective action via redundancy, the sending of the same message along multiple paths or else repeatedly along the same path (Chwe, 1995...

A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in ?market design? had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and...

I present a model of financing social enterprises to delineate the role of impact investors relative to “pure” philanthropists. I characterize the optimal scale and structure of a social enterprise when financed by grants, and when financed by investments. The analysis yields two heuristics...

In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...

Stability and "no justified envy" are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility...