En France, la fraude fiscale représenterait selon les estimations du syndicat national des impôts près de 45 milliards d'euros soit presque le montant des recettes de l'impôt sur le revenu. À l'échelle européenne, la fraude fiscale est estimée à au moins 2% du PIB des 25 pays membres,...

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal–agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation...

This paper provides a general framework that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in most experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. Each player balances her material utility loss from contributing with her psychological utility loss of deviating from her...

We provide a new experimental investigation of the neutrality theorem of Warr (1983), according to which “when a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is unaffected by a redistribution of income". Our experimental design differs from Chan...

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements†can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known...

Nous étudions expérimentalement les résultats d’un jeu de coordination à deux joueurs et deux actions par joueur répété sur 50 périodes. Ce jeu de coordination de type « chasse au cerf » possède deux équilibres de Nash en stratégie pure qui sont Pareto ordonnés : un...

In nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each polluter’s individual emission, which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments. Therefore new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution. In an experiment, we compare the...

In nonpoint source pollution problems, the regulator does not observe each polluter’s individual emission, which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments. Therefore, new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution. In an experiment, we compare the...

We test a repeated principal-agent relationship with hidden actions in the laboratory. At each period, the principal offers payments to the agent in order to induce him to provide the high effort level. The agent can accept or reject the offer; if he accepts it, he can choose the high or the low...