Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less...

Poverty measures in developing countries often ignore the distribution of resources within families and the gains from joint consumption. In this paper, we extend the collective model of household consumption to recover mother's, father's and children's shares together with economies of scale,...

The present paper develops a theoretical model of labor supply with domestic production. It is shown that the structural components of the model can be identified without using a distribution factor, thereby generalizing the initial results of Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997). The...

Poverty measures in developing countries often ignore the distribution of resources within families and the gains from joint consumption. In this paper, we extend the collective model of household consumption to recover mother's, father's and children's shares together with economies of scale,...

We examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household composed of one adult and one child. We then show that ‘favorable’ distortions from price subsidies may allow redistributing...

The present paper develops a collective model of labor supply with domestic production. It is shown that the structural components of the model can be identified without using a distribution factor, thereby generalizing the initial results of Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997). The...

Since the seminal work of MINCER [1962] and BECKER [1965], the interest for the study of individual and household time allocation has been on the rise. In this introduction, we provide a brief, impressionistic survey of this large and rapidly growing literature and then discuss the organization...

We consider the decisions of a married couple in a risky environment. The distribution of spouses’ bargaining power may change as a result of new outside opportunities that become available to them, so that individual consumption may fluctuate over time. This is what we call “bargaining...