Using a comprehensive international trade data set we investigate empirical regularities (known as Zipf’s Law or the rank-size rule) for the distribution of the interaction between countries as measured by revealed comparative advantage. Using the recently developed estimator by Gabaix and...

We derive the exact finite sample distribution of the <I>L<SUB>1</SUB></I>-version ofthe Fisz-Cramér-von Mises test statistic (<I>L<SUB>1</SUB></I>-FCvM). We first characterizethe set of all distinct sample p-p plots for two balanced sampleof size <I>n</I> absent ties. Next, we order this set according to the correspondingvalue of...</i></i></sub></i></sub></i>

This discussion paper resulted in the publication <I>The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy</I> (2007), 7(1), 1135.<P> Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As...</p></i>

We estimate the incremental financing decision for a sample of some 150Dutch companies for the years 1984 through 1997, thereby distinguishinginternal finance and three types of external finance: bank borrowing, bondissues and share issues. First, we estimate a multinomial logit model...

This discussion paper resulted in the article <I>Journal of Economic Education</I> (2008), 39(4), 357-373.<P> This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages...</p></i>

P-p plots contain all the information that is needed for scale-invariant comparisons. Indeed, Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) tests translate sample p-p plots into a single number. In this paper we characterize the set of all distinct p-p plots for two balanced sample of size <I>n</I> absent...</i>

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN,...

An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...

We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general conditions on the cost-of-location function under which a pure strategy price-location Nash equilibrium exists. With linear transportation cost and a suitably specified cost of location that rises...

The information contained in PP-plots is transformed into a single number. The resulting Harmonic Mass (HM) index is distribution free and its sample counterpart is shown to be consistent. For a wide class of CDFs the exact analytical expression of the distribution of the sample HM index is...